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This thesis considers the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore and the abilities of the littoral states to
control the use of this navigational choke point during a
crisis situation. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have
drastically improved the capabilities of their militaries in
the past ten years. Together, they can deny the use of this
key naval transit corridor to other navies. The region is
considered from a historical and current perspective and the
force build-up and capabilities are examined. The US and
Soviet interest in the region is also considered. Conclu-
sions are reached concerning the strategic value of the
region and future US considerations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the military buildup in the
littoral nations on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and
their ability to control the Straits. The Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are the key navigational choke points
in Southeast Asia, yet were not much more than a legal issue
for US naval strategists until two decades ago. [Leifer,
1978, Ch. 5] Even today, strategists are more interested in
the world's other choke points. These straits are literally
neglected and little known choke points.
The Straits offer a safe, direct route between the
Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The economic value of the
Straits is immense. In 1983, 6570 foreign trade vessels
entered peninsular Malaysian ports. In 1984, Singapore
alone serviced 26,458 ships that discharged and loaded over
104,000,000 metric tons of cargo. [Europa Publications,
1985, pp. 615, 865] Alternate shipping routes would have
added days to shipping times as well as a proportionate
amount to the cost. Singapore, in particular, is dependent
on Straits traffic for much of its economic livelihood.
The military value of the Straits is harder to define,
but can be measured in time. Both the US and the USSR
routinely use the Straits. They are key naval transit
corridors for the forward-deployed US Seventh Fleet and an
economic, all-weather route between the Baltic/Black Seas
and the East Asian coast for the Soviets. Both the US and
the USSR agree that the Straits are international waters,
not subject to control by littoral nations. Malaysia and
Indonesia, however, consider the channels within their
respective territorial control.
The current situation in the Western Pacific has drawn
attention to the strategic value of the Southeast Asian
water passages. The littoral states, Indonesia, Singapore,
and Malaysia, have young governments sensitive to their
geographic importance and to their standing in world
affairs. They consider themselves significant factors in
any strategic calculus for control of the Straits region.
The US has long been involved in the Western Pacific but,
until recently, had few commitments in Southeast Asia. The
Soviets, on the other hand, have actively tried to influence
events in the Straits states, with little success. The
United Kingdom, as head of the Commonwealth, is interested
in the region, but has not regained the influence it had
prior to World War II. Australia has military bases on the
Straits and active treaties with Malaysia and Singapore.
The three littoral states are among the world's fastest
developing nations. The superpowers must consider them in
any conflict, regional or otherwise, that requires naval
passage. Their forces could be considered complementary
and, if used jointly, could control the strategic initiative
in the early days of a non-nuclear- conflict. No country,
including the superpowers, can assume that it will have free
access to the Straits between the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific Ocean in time of war.
Over the years access to, and control of, the Straits
have been a concern of many seafaring peoples. The Arab
traders, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British all had
their turn at being the primary foreign influence. During
World War II, the Japanese conquered the region as part of
their plan to dominate the Western Pacific. After the
Japanese were defeated, the major powers were involved in
European reconstruction. This area was not of great impor-
tance, although the British Navy maintained forces in
Malaya. The Dutch had military forces in Indonesia, but
withdrew them when Indonesia gained independence in 1949.
The United States had priorities elsewhere, particularly in
the Philippines. The Soviets were not initially able to
invest scarce resources so far from their homeland, although
they did so later.
In 1963, Malaysia was formed. Just two years later,
Singapore was invited to leave and form a separate state.
Indonesia was openly hostile to both Malaysia and Singapore
and attempted to dominate the region until 1966. The
Soviets fueled the conflict and supplied military aid to
Sukarno until the change in government in 1966, when they
were forced to withdraw and left without significant power
in the region.
For the next nine years, the three countries worked at
normalizing relations and stabilizing their positions. All
were occupied with domestic concerns, but not to the exclu-
sion of the international situation.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was
formed in 1967. In 1969, Malaysia and Indonesia reached
agreement on the maritime issues dividing them, and in 1972
took a joint position on the customary status of the
Straits. [Leifer, 1978, p. 30] By 1975, the littoral
nations were cooperating militarily on a bilateral basis,
and had begun a new military buildup and strategic develop-
ment for the region.
Eleven years later, the military balance has shifted.
My hypothesis is that the littoral nations of the Straits
can control the strategic initiative in the region for all
but a nuclear conflict. Their interests are based on their
own national needs, not superpower desires.
The United States' national interest dictates an aware-
ness of this region. To maintain a proper perspective, the
significance of the Straits must be defined not only from a
US position, but from that of other nations' as well. The
military force compositions must be evaluated and the
littoral nations' policies analyzed. Accordingly, this
thesis will consider the preceding and will assess factors
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that will be significant in the -control of the straits
during conflict.
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II. THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
—
THE VIEW FROM THE LITTORAL STATES
A. GEOGRAPHY OF THE MAJOR STRAITS
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are located at the
southern tip of Southeast Asia, between 6°N and 1°N, on the
Sunda Shelf. The Strait of Malacca opens into the Indian
Ocean on the northwest and into the Strait of Singapore on
the east. Its funnel shape is bordered on the north by
peninsular Malaysia, and on the south by Sumatra. The
Andaman Islands are in line with the western outlet.
Thailand is north of the northwestern edge of the Strait
access. The main channel of the Strait of Malacca is
approximately 260 miles long, and varies in width from 3 to
300 miles. [Johnston, 1978, p. 176] There are three places
where the twelve mile territorial claims of Indonesia and
Malaysia overlap, and several others where the channel is in
one or the other's territorial waters. [Vertzberger, 1984,
p. 4] Much of the main channel is relatively shallow. The
main currents are steady but there are cross-currents, and
tides vary with the seasonal winds. The bottom is primarily
sand and rock and shifts frequently. [Johnston, 1977, p.
176] The Strait of Singapore flows from the Strait of
Malacca to the Pacific Ocean, is 75 miles long, and no more
than twelve miles wide. [Vertzberger, 1984, p. 4] It is
bordered by Singapore on the north and the Indonesian
12
archipelago on the south and west. - Its bottom is sand and
rock, and also shifts periodically.
Four other major straits are entirely within Indonesian
territory. The Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java, is
the main passage between the Indian Ocean and the Java Sea
and is approximately fifty miles long. It is the most
direct sea link between Subic Bay in the Philippines and
Diego Garcia, but is not suitable for very large ships
because of its shallowness in several areas. [Leifer, 1978,
p. 78]
The Makassar Strait and the Lombok Strait are complemen-
tary. The Makassar Strait flows north-south between
Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The Lombok Strait links the
Makassar Strait with the Indian Ocean. Their combined
navigable width is eleven miles, their length is over 600
miles and they are suitable for submerged passage. [Leifer,
1978, p. 79]
The Ombai-Wetar Straits are in the lesser Sundas, and
not much used for international traffic. They are suitable
for submerged passage and have been used as an alternate
deep water route for submarines enroute from Guam to the
Indian Ocean. [Leifer, 1978, p. 79]
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE—STRAITS REGION
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore comprise the key
navigational choke point in Southeast Asia and the most
convenient maritime link between the Indian and Pacific
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oceans. The Strait of Malacca .has served as a marine
corridor between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea
since the fifth century A.D. It was not used in conjunction
with the Strait of Singapore as part of a direct trans-
oceanic route until centuries later. [Leifer, 1978, p. 6]
The Chinese used the waterways for trading resins and
spice with the Srivijaya empire, which controlled the
Straits of Malacca and Sunda, from the seventh until the
fourteenth century. The Majapahit empire maintained loose
control of Java and the sea trade from the thirteenth
century until the sixteenth. During that era, Arab traders
introduced Islam, which became a unifying force, even though
Hindu and 3uddist influences remained.
Europeans discovered the Spice Islands, as the area was
called, in the late 1500s. The Portuguese, in an attempt to
dominate the region and to control the Strait of Malacca,
established a settlement in Malacca in 1511. By the end of
the century, however, they had lost their influence. The
Dutch colonized Java and much of what is now Indonesia for
trade purposes, but had to turn over their possessions to
the British after the French revolutionary troops occupied
the Netherlands in 1814. The English governed Malaya and
the islands until the Indies were returned to the Nether-
lands in 1816. The English retained control of the Malay
peninsula and what became the Straits settlements. Penang,
Malacca and Singapore were valued for their strategic
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locations on the Strait of Malacca. After several local
wars, the Dutch regained control of their colony and then
negotiated with the British to formalize the arrangement.
The resulting treaty, which defined spheres of influence,
was signed in 1824 and not revised until 1871.
Dutch rule was characterized by a series of bloody wars
inspired in part by militant Islamic followers. Islam
unified the Moslems, Nationalists and Marxists in the
rebellion against the colonists in the straits region,
particularly in Indonesia. The Nationalist movement started
in the early 1900s. One of its members, Sukarno, joined the
ranks of the leaders in the 1920s. He closely allied the
movement with the Islamic leadership and the communists.
The Dutch were not responsive to any of the groups' demands.
When the colonists were evicted, it was not by the Moslems,
Marxists or Nationalists but by the Japanese, who completed
their conquest of the area in 1942. They wanted to control
the strategic waterways through which they shipped so much
of their war material. They also needed the natural
resources, the rubber and the petroleum.
Sukarno, by then the leader of the Indonesian
Nationalist Party which he helped found, cooperated with the
Japanese occupation forces. Later he claimed that he had
not collaborated so much as worked for independence. He was
involved in extensive negotiations with the Japanese.
During one of those sessions, he requested that the Malay
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peninsula be incorporated with Indonesia. The Japanese
rewarded him for his cooperation on 17 August 1945 by
granting independence to all of the former Dutch East
Indies, Timor, Borneo, and Malaya. As the new head of
state, Sukarno was forced to hand over control of the
government when the Europeans returned after the war. He
continued as a leader of the independence movement and as a
figurehead president. Sukarno was involved in the negotia-
tions with the Dutch that granted republican rule of Java
and Sumatra to the Central Indonesian National Committee.
The Dutch insisted that Indonesians form a union with The
Netherlands while other states were formed in the rest of
Indonesia. The Dutch used a naval blockade in 1947 to stop
the republican forces from spreading their influence and
they nearly quashed the rebellion against Dutch rule. At
the same time, different factions within the Indonesian
republic fought among themselves. The result was another
crackdown by the Dutch military to force peace, and
submission to Dutch authority. It was not until January
1949 that the newly-formed United Nations urged the Dutch to
relinquish control of the colony. On 1 July 1950, the
Republic of the United States of Indonesia was recognized.
It did not include Malaya, parts of Borneo or West New
Guinea. In 1963 the Dutch ceded West New Guinea as Irian
Jaya. Portuguese joined Indonesia in 1976.
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Sukarno's administration was characterized by numerous
problems and conflicts, one of which was inspired partly by
a desire to control the waterways in the region. On 13
December 1957, Indonesia claimed all waterways in the
archipelago as territory, extended its territorial claim to
12 miles, and used straight baselines to establish the new
boundaries. Maritime nations were told that their ships
would be granted innocent passage. Sukarno was openly
hostile to Malaysia and Singapore for their Western leanings
and for permitting foreign military bases. Under his
"confrontation" policy, he initiated military action in
Sabah and Sarawak and sent guerrillas into the Malay
peninsula. Indonesia continued its territorial claims until
1966, when power passed to General Suharto and a peace
treaty was signed. [Bunge, 1983, Ch. 1] The tensions in
the region lessened since the new leadership no longer
seemed to perceive that external forces were trying to limit
Indonesian influence. [Leifer, 1978, p. 15]
Malaysia's colonial history was different. The Portu-
guese settled in Malacca as the power of the Sultanates was
on the wane. The Dutch gained control in 1641, but ceded
their authority to the British at the end of the next
century. The British settled in Penang in 1786 because of
its port and strategic location, at the western end of the
Malacca Strait. With the establishment of Singapore in
1819, Britain had de facto control of the Straits. By 1909,
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British Malaya consisted of the three ports known as the
Straits Settlements, the four Federated Malay States and the
five Unfederated Malay States. The British maintained
control of the peninsula until the Japanese invasion in
1942.
After World War II, in 1946, all the British holdings on
the peninsula except Singapore joined the Federation of
Malaya. In 1948, the British declared a state of emergency
that lasted 12 years. During that time, counterinsurgency
forces fought communists who were primarily ethnic Chinese
upset with the favoritism granted the native Malays by the
government. The British granted the Federation independence
in 1957. In 1963, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak
joined to become Malaysia. At this time Sukarno started his
"confrontation" policy which was supposed to prevent
Malaysia from forming a federation and to encourage the
Malays to join Indonesia. [Bunge, 1984, p. 4]
Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965 for
ethnic reasons. Singapore's residents were predominantly
Chinese. The rest of Malaysia was primarily Malay, with a
large ethnic Chinese minority and a small Tamil group. The
resentment of the native Malays against the Chinese created
numerous problems for the young government. Finally, Prime
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kwan-Yew negotiated
Singapore's withdrawal from the Federation, with the under-
standing that joint defense arrangements would be made.
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The 1966 treaty ending the military conflict between
Malaysia and Indonesia greatly benefited the two countries.
Malaysia's racial problems were still of great concern to
the government and military forces were needed for counter-
insurgency actions. [Gullick, 1981, Ch. 11] Indonesia's
economy was faltering and funds were needed elsewhere. The
reduction in tensions was facilitated by the withdrawal of
the Soviets and the unobtrusive support of Commonwealth
forces. Additional agreements between the countries were
driven by a common desire to reduce external threats from
each other and by a need to compensate for the announced
British withdrawal east of the Suez. The change in attitude
was best exemplified by the Malaysian prime minister in 1968
when he stated that the military forces were for the mainte-
nance of internal security. [Broinowski, 1982, Ch. 2] By
the mid-70 's, Malaysia and Indonesia were conducting joint
operations against the guerrilla forces in Kalimantan.
Indonesia's naval capability declined substantially during
this period. The original Soviet equipment was neglected
and not effectively used.
In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) was formed. ASEAN was (and still is) a union
intended to economically benefit its members: Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Phillipines—Brunei
joined in 1984. Leifer states that the framework of ASEAN
allowed Indonesia an opportunity to pursue "its regional
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ambitions but within a willingly accepted contest of con-
straint that would protect the legitimate interests of its
fellow member states." [Leifer, 1978, p. 28] No military
pact linked ASEAN members, but separate bilateral agreements
linked the governments.
The three littoral nations were deeply aware of the
possibilities of external pressures in the region and the
problems of internal subversion. In 1971, Singapore and
Malaysia signed a treaty, known as the Five Power Pact, with
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand for an inte-
grated defense of the region. The Integrated Air Defense
System supported the agreement that the defense of Singapore
and Malaysia was indivisible. This led Indonesia to
announce in 1975 that its foreign policy would opt for
regional security based upon indigenous strengths and to
reaffirm that the Indonesian military would be used for the
defense of Malaysia if it were invaded. By 1975, Vietnam
was ample proof that the US could not be considered a
reliable ally against communist insurrection. [Krause,
1982, p. 27] In the same year, terrorist activity increased
in the region. Malaysia and Indonesia both concentrated on
building up their counterinsurgency forces and their arms
buying was aimed at supporting those forces.
The economic situation was good for all three countries
at the end of the 1970s. Cash was readily available for
military procurement. The armed forces were all being
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improved. As the guerrilla threat- subsided, Malaysia and
Indonesia were able to look outward. Bilateral defense
agreements were renegotiated and new arrangements among the
three were rumored, some confirmed publicly. Singapore
maintained a pro-West policy while the other two maintained
an anti-Chinese posture.
C. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA III
In 1982, the Third United Nations Conference on Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III) concluded its work and presented its
convention to the world community for ratification. The
conference opened in 1973 and had its first major session in
Caracas in 1974. During the sixth session, in 1977, the
Informal Consolidated Negotiating Text was drafted. It
became the basis for the new convention. The conference was
nearly ended but the United States withdrew its acceptance
of the convention in 1981 after the Reagan Administration
took office. Among the issues in contention were the arti-
cles relating to deep sea mining. The conference members
attempted to resolve the conflict, but failed. In 1982. the
conference was terminated and the convention presented as it
was. Although the United States did not accept the Conven-
tion, the President publicly stated on 10 March 1983 that
the US would accept the articles that cover traditional
navigational practice, which include the articles that cover
archipelagic states, international straits, transit and
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innocent passage, and the responsibilities of coastal
states.
The articles referring to the archipelago concept have
their roots in the Sukarno administration. As early as
1957, Sukarno claimed the waters around Indonesia as part of
its territory. [O'Connell, 1982, p. 249] By 1960, the
Indonesian concept of the archipelagic state was being
discussed in international forums, but was unacceptable to
the US, among others. The US was willing only to concede a
three mile territorial sea around each island. The debate
continued through the sixties and led to the item being
placed on the agenda for UNCLOS III.
-
' During the conference, the Indonesian delegation, under
orders from Suharto, hammered out the navigational
principles involved. By the time the session ended in 1977,
the archipelagic concept had been developed, legitimized and
accepted by both the archipelagic states and the maritime
nations. Island nations were given considerable authority
to govern waters defined as theirs. [Booth, 1985, p. 22]
The definition was tailored for the Indonesian situation in
such a way that the baselines that defined Indonesia created
the largest archipelagic nation in the world. Indonesia has
over 13,600 islands and an area of 4.8 million square
kilometers, of which only 1.9 million are land. [Bunge,
1983, p. 67]
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Although an archipelagic state has sovereignty over
archipelagic waters, ships of all states have the right of
innocent passage. [UNCLOS, Articles 49, 52] Additionally,
the archipelagic state may designate sea lanes and air
routes that include all normal routes used in international
navigation. [UNCLOS, Article 53] Those routes are subject
to the same rules as high sea travel, so passage through the
straits exclusively in Indonesian waters (Sunda,
Makassar/Lombok, and Ombai-Wetar) is governed in accordance
with the articles of Part IV of the Convention. This
concept has been acknowledged by the superpowers.
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore, on the other hand,
are governed by Part III. It states, in part, that the
regime of passage through straits used for international
navigation does not affect the legal status of the waters.
[UNCLOS, Article 34] The waters may be part of a state's
territory, as are parts of the Straits where the channel is
less than 12 miles from shore or part of two states' claim
where the channel is less than 24 miles wide, but that does
not change the laws governing international navigation
through those waters. States bordering straits are allowed
to regulate traffic within certain limits [UNCLOS, Article
42], but they are not allowed to suspend transit passage.
[UNCLOS, Article 44] That includes submerged passage and
overflights.
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"Transit passage" is defined in- Section 2 of Part III.
It was a new concept presented as a compromise between free
transit and innocent passage. It is defined as:
the exercise ... of the freedom of navigation and over-
flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expedi-
tious transit of the strait between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone. [UNCLOS, Article
38]
In other words, warships, submarines and aircraft which did
not meet the requirements of innocent passage were allowed
to transit international straits, but were subject to
regulations that ships in free transit were not.
The concept was accepted by the maritime nations for
practical purposes in April 1982. They agreed to a request
by Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to prevent vessels
with less than 3.5 meters of under-keel clearance to transit
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The maritime nations,
by agreeing to the littoral nations' request, acknowledged
that the Straits were subject to transit passage
requirements and not to free transit, and that the littoral
nations could regulate that passage within the bounds of the
Convention. Maritime nations which formally endorsed the
request also approved the littoral nations' responsibility
to enforce such regulations. The United States confirmed
acceptance of the request on 29 April 1982, during the
eleventh session.
Part II also firmly established that the territorial sea
extends twelve miles and is part of the sovereign territory
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of a coastal state. [Cuyvers, 1984, p. 152] The coastal
state does not have the right to suspend innocent passage in
those waters. [UNCLOS, Article 45] However, passage is no
longer innocent when it is prejudicial to the security of
the coastal state. The definition of prejudicial was not
spelled out and has not been tested in the waters of these
three nations.
The Law of the Sea Convention, even though not ratified
by the US, can be expected to have an effect on future naval
operations in this region, but it will not fundamentally
affect the use of naval power, especially by a superpower.
[Booth, 1985, p. 7] Overall, the primary effect of UNCLOS
III "will be to ensure that to a greater extent than ever
before the sea will be seen as extension of the land."
[Booth, 1985, p. 57] Nations that deal with the littoral
states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will have to
plan accordingly.
D. CURRENT SITUATION
Viewed by the littoral states, the current situation is
mixed. There is good cooperation among the littorals.
Passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is in
accordance with the regime of the Law of the Sea. The
littoral governments accept transit passage and their
responsibilities to maintain the Straits for international
navigation. They do not openly state what their wartime
position will be.
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Indonesia no longer openly aspires to regional domina-
tion. The overall emphasis has shifted from intraregional
antagonism to regional security. All three, Indonesia more
so than the others, are attempting to remain securely in the
non-aligned fold. Indonesia is an acknowledged leader in
that movement. Although there are still complex racial
problems, the internal security threat has lessened and the
governments can focus on the international scene. All are
aware that much of their international importance derives
from their geographic position on one of the world's major
choke points.
Malaysia and Indonesia have similar policies with regard
to the Straits. They run regular joint naval exercises as
part of their mutual defense agreements. They have recently
renewed their agreement to continue military cooperation on
their land borders, as well. They both request prior noti-
fication of naval passage. They have not indicated that
they would confront either superpower during a conflict, but
neither have they guaranteed support to either side.
Malaysia is still a strong proponent of the ZOPFAN (Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) concept, but the push for a
nuclear-free zone has limited support from the littorals.
Malaysia and Indonesia run joint patrols in the battle
against pirates and smugglers. Pirates have intercepted
ships in the Straits and robbed them of their cash and
easily-sold cargo. This naturally concerns shippers and
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governments alike. The pirates operate small, fast craft in
the southern exits of the Straits, where attacks occur
frequently. Singapore and Malaysia use integrated maritime
forces to fight the problem. Indonesia has a second problem
area in the Sulu Sea. [Moore, 1986, p. 138] The patrols
have helped, but piracy still exists.
Problems posed by the influx of refugees continue.
There is a fear that some of the refugees are a security
threat, a Chinese fifth column. Consequently, ethnic
Chinese refugees are regarded with suspicion and sometimes
with hostility. The primary problem, though, is the socio-
economic impact of the refugees on the local economy. The
cost of caring for the refugees is often more than populace
is willing to absorb. Additionally, the refugee population
is neither Malay nor Moslem and that contributes to ethnic
antagonisms.
The racial situation has improved, for the most part.
In Malaysia, the New Economic Program (NEP) has helped
balance the distribution of wealth and business ownership,
but target dates will not be met because of the downturn in
the economy. Regardless, the Malays now own more of the
businesses than they did and the Chinese own less. The
forced change in the economic situation of the Chinese
coupled with the wave of resurgent Islam have led the
authorities to fear strife between the Chinese and the
Moslems.
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Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are cooperating to
make the Straits as safe as possible. Navigation safety has
improved in spite of the shallow, irregular depths. Poor
visibility is often a problem, especially when the traffic
volume is high. Consequently, the littorals ensure that the
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) , approved in May 1981, is
used. Its provisions include restricting passage to vessels
with more than 3.5 meters clearance, and draughts less than
15 meters. Speed is limited to twelve knots. They also
cooperate on pollution safeguards. The largest supertankers
do not use the Straits, but transit one of the deeper
Indonesian straits. Indonesia is developing the port capa-
bilities to service those ships.
Singapore is much more interested in freedom of naviga-
tion on the Straits than the other two littoral states.
Singapore's priority is maintaining the traditional rights
of navigation in the Straits without adversely affecting the
interests of the other littoral states. Its economy is
dependent upon maritime traffic. While Singaporeans make
common cause with Malaysia and Indonesia with respect to
navigational safety and pollution control, they are aware
that ingress and egress to their commercial port facilities
lie in Malaysian and Indonesian territorial waters.
[Leifer, 1978, p. 34] Their economic policy for the use of
those facilities is pragmatic. Services are available to
those who pay. Consequently, Soviet ships are serviced
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along with Western ships. This does not affect Singapore's
pro-West stance.
The excellent economic situation at the end of the last
decade has declined. The fall in oil prices adversely-
affected all three economies. Indonesia and Malaysia lost
much needed income from the sale of oil, while Singapore's
oil refineries are not being utilized at capacity. Mean-
while, the commodity export markets have softened and the
demand for rubber, tin, sugar and agricultural products has
decreased. Even the electronics market is soft. The drop
in semiconductor prices has been felt in both Singapore and
Malaysia. In 1985, for the first time since 1967,
Singapore's economy shrank by 1.8% [Jackson, 1986, p. 3],
The government was forced to cut expenditures.
Malaysia's GNP grew in 1985 at less than half the 1984
rate [Jackson, 1986, p. 6]. The contracting economy caused
problems among ethnic groups, but the government response
has been pragmatic. The target dates for the NEP have been
changed. [Jackson, 1986, p. 9] One of the results is a cut
in defense expenditures for new equipment.
Economically, Indonesia has the most problems. Revenue
from oil exports had been subsidizing the industrialization
program. Without that income, the budget has been cut
drastically and the industries supported by that money have
been unable to make up the shortfall. [Jackson, 1986, p.
11] As in Malaysia, severe government cutbacks may lead to
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ethnic disharmony. The ethnic Ma-lays expect their living
standards to improve. There is resentment against the
minority ethnic groups that are economically better off than
the majority populace. This, coupled with Islamic
resurgence and normal ethnic hostilities, has created a
difficult situation for the governments of Malaysia and
Indonesia.
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III. STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
—
THE VIEW FROM THE NON-LITTORAL STATES
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The involvement of non-littoral states in the region
dates back several centuries. The area has always been
vulnerable to external naval force, and relatively defense-
less against foreign maritime forces. The Dutch navy routed
the Portuguese in the thirteenth century. The British used
their superior navy to extend the empire's control over the
Malay peninsula and Indonesian islands. The Japanese navy
conquered the area during World War II but could not main-
tain control toward the end of the war, partly because of
the mining campaign. Britain returned after the war and
successfully reoccupied its prewar realm because of its
naval forces. The Dutch blockaded the new Indonesian
republic which had been declared by Sukarno just before the
Japanese surrendered. National independence became a
reality only after the Dutch ended their blockade and
allowed the UN-arbitrated settlement to become effective.
Indonesia's ineffective navy was also a factor in the
dispute with Holland over West New Guinea. [Leifer, 1978,
p. 16]
The British were strong supporters of the Malays and
ensured that the new nation had a good start. Even after
Malaysia was established, the British maintained naval
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forces. Indonesia's "confrontation'' policy stimulated the
British to build up additional naval forces in Singapore.
In September 1964, the British demonstrated their support of
the young Malaysian government by sending the strike carrier
HMS Victorious through Lombok Strait. It was an exercise in
coercive diplomacy. [Leifer, 1978, p. 16] The move also
demonstrated that Britain did not support Indonesia's claim
that all waters were territorial and subject to Indonesian
sovereignty. The British and other western navies would not
support any infringement on freedom of the seas.
The Soviets in Southeast Asia had no naval forces of any
importance. Consequently, they backed the Indonesian
initiative to restrict naval activities in the waters
Indonesia claimed were territorial. They granted extensive
military credits to Sukarno, some of which were used to
build up his naval forces. Soviet military advisors were
forced to leave, though, when General Suharto took over in
1966.
Soon after the British announced their accelerated
withdrawal east of Suez in January 1968, the Soviets made
their first transit of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
enroute to the Indian Ocean. During this same period, the
US expressed interest in developing Diego Garcia, a British
holding. Indonesia was concerned about what they considered
"the naval interest demonstrated by the superpowers in
passage between the Pacific and Indian oceans in competition
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with one another" and the possibility of becoming "entangled
in the maritime dimension of superpower conflict." [Leifer,
1978, p. 17]
On 2 August 1969, the Malaysian government extended its
territorial claim to 12 miles, using straight base lines.
This ensured a more equitable basis for discussion with
Indonesia on maritime issues. It also ensured that the
maritime nations of the world must consider the status of
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Soviets responded
in September with an aide memoire that objected "to the
indiscriminate extension of territorial seas." [Leifer,
1978, p. 107] This was a major change from the position
they had taken earlier when the Indonesians had made the
same announcement. The Soviets made a point of differen-
tiating between territorial seas and straits used for
international navigation.
By the 198 0s, the US, UK and the USSR agreed that the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore were used for international
navigation and that all ships had the right of unimpaired
passage. The PRC disagreed and supported Malaysia and
Indonesia's claim to a twelve-mile limit. Ironically, both
countries were suspicious of the Chinese support for their
position. [Moulton, 1973, p. 192] The maritime powers did
not agree it was in Malaysia and Indonesia's national inter-
est to control the Straits and did not accept the argument
that the waters were territorial. Malaysia and Indonesia
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noted that they would permit innocent passage of all ships.
The principle of innocent passage reserved for Malaysia and
Indonesia the right to stop and search any vessel passing
through the Straits. The US protested.
In April 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani war, the US
tested the principle of free passage through international
waters. The USS Ticonderoqa and battle group sailed through
the Straits enroute to the Indian Ocean. In September, the
USS Enterprise and battle group transited the Straits to the
Indian Ocean. In neither case was permission asked or
granted. In accordance with the US policy concerning inter-
national waters, the US considered the air space over the
center of the Straits to be international also and filed
flight plans accordingly. Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia
interfered with the US passage.
In March 1972, the USSR publicly announced its opposi-
tion to the joint Indonesian/Malaysian position on the
Straits. Now that they were also a naval power, they
regarded the Straits as an international waterway. [Leifer,
1978, Ch. 4] The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Thomas J. Moorer agreed with the USSR, and insisted
on "freedom of passage for his country's naval vessels
through the Straits regardless of Indonesia's and Malaysia's
claim" and, more importantly, said that their claim
"constituted one of the most serious problems that the
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American government was dealing with and [was] the subject
of intensive negotiations. [Leifer, 1978, Ch. 4 footnote]
The problem had not been resolved before the next
pronouncement. In January 197 3, Malaysia announced that it:
rejected the right of warships to pass through the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore without the prior authorization
of the coastal states, arguing that by the very nature of
a warship its passage anywhere could not be 'innocent.'
[Leifer, 1978, p. 119]
The maritime powers objected.
The US response was based on the principle of freedom of
the seas. Prior to the Yom Kippur War, the US had a limited
interest in the Straits, except for its legal status. After
the war, US strategists were aware of the need to freely
enter the Indian Ocean. In October 1973, the USS Hancock
and a task force went through the Straits without notifying
the littoral states. Besides showing the flag, the US
wished to show that they expected freedom of transit and
that they would use that freedom to transit "in moments of
crisis to protect American interests around its littoral."
[Leifer, 1978, p. 123] After that show of force, the US did
not force the issue again, although the USS Ranger transited
during the Entebbe hostage crisis in July 1976.
In 1974, the US decided to build up the base in Diego
Garcia. That caused the Sunda Strait to assume new
importance, since it is the shortest route between Diego
Garcia and Subic Bay. The US disengagement from Vietnam
occurred at the same time. The loss of facilities in
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Vietnam spurred interest in the Indian Ocean littoral and
the routes that led into the Indian Ocean.
The United States and the Soviet Union argued at the
Second Session of UNCLOS III for freedom of passage in
straits used in international navigation. This included the
right of overflight and submerged passage. [Leifer, 1978,
p. 129] The geography of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore defused the issue of submerged passage due to the
shallowness of the channel in so many places, but the
general principle was debated since submerged passage was
possible in the Indonesian straits. Too, the right of
overflight was a major concern to the United States. Both
the USSR and the US agreed to accept the twelve mile terri-
torial limit, but not where it covered the Straits.
[Leifer, 1978, p. 94]
The issue of submerged passage was especially interest-
ing. Leifer states that:
since 1966 what might be described as a de facto alliance
has evolved between Indonesia and the United States.
Despite the general principle that has been adopted with
respect to the great powers and freedom of navigation, the
Indonesian government has been tolerant of the U.S. main-
tenance of a naval presence within Southeast Asia.
[Leifer, 1978, p. 153]
This agreement evolved between the two countries in spite of
the 1958 Geneva Convention that submarine passage is inno-
cent only if the submarine surfaced and showed its flag.
Leifer believes that the US Navy gives the Indonesians
notification without divulging the exact position of the
36
submarines. This compromise satisfies the US strategic
requirement for secrecy and the Indonesian territorial
claim.
In 1977, the US reaffirmed its intention to maintain a
strategic presence in the Southeast Asian region. The
Reagan administration has not changed that stance.
1 . Mining
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore became a focus
of military interest during World War II, when they were
minded. Penang, on the northwestern opening of the Strait
of Malacca was used as a submarine based by the Japanese and
the Germans. The RAF started mining the entrance to the
port in Penang on a regular basis in October 1944. The
campaign was successful and port activity was slowed. The
Germans moved their submarines to Batavia (Jakarta)
.
In January 1945, the Allies campaign to cut Japan
off from its war supplies began in earnest. B-29s "sowed
hundreds of magnetic mines in the approaches to Singapore
. . . in an opening move to block Japan's sea lanes, cut her
pipelines and empty her rice bowls." [Lott, 1959, p. 206]
The RAF mined Singapore again in March. The magnetic mines
prevented the use of iron ships on the Bangkok-Singapore
run, but not before Japanese merchant ships were sunk. When
the Japanese switched to wooden ships, the Allies laid
acoustic mines. Shipping via the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore dropped off substantially.
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Arnold Lott observes that the successful mining
operation is not necessarily measured by the tonnage sunk.
The absence of shipping in the mined areas is a much more
important indicator of success. [Lott, 1959, p. 215] The
Allied campaign was successful on both counts.
Lessons learned from that experience are rather
straightforward. The Straits are easy to mine. The bottom
is sandy and quickly covers mines. The Straits are shallow
enough to force ships into narrow channels that are more
easily closed by mines. Littoral armed forces must have
good countermine capabilities or mining will be just as
effective now as it was then.
B. CURRENT SITUATION
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are strategically
significant to the superpowers. As Kusumaatmadj a and
Damisaputro point out it is "a natural passage for navies
seeking access from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans and
back." [Johnson, 1978, p. 174] The strategic value is
apparent when measured as time to deploy from one ocean to
the other. A ship transiting from Japan to the Persian Gulf
would need 9% more time to go through the Sunda Strait, 18%
more through the Makassar/Lombok Straits and 23% more
through the Ombai-Wetar Straits. [Vertzberger, 1984, p. 11]
The United States routinely uses the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore as a primary naval transit corridor for the
forward deployed Seventh Fleet. The USSR depends on the
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straits for an economic, all-weather route for Baltic/Black
Sea fleets sailing to the Asian east coast. Ships out of
Vladivostok use the Straits to reach the Indian Ocean.
Alternate passages include the Straits of Sunda and
Lombok/Makassar, which are longer and under exclusive
Indonesian control.
The East Asian countries, Japan especially, rely on
tankers bringing oil through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. Very large ships use the alternate channels out
of necessity, not for economic reasons. Merchant ships
utilize the Straits because it is the shortest route.
The littoral states have signed the LOS Convention. The
United States, which did not, has abided by the articles
that affect Straits waters, but has not indicated if it
would do so during a conflict. The United States still has
two major policy concerns with respect to the region. One
is "the maintenance of the efficacy and credibility of its
second-strike nuclear capability" [Leifer, 1978, p. 161] and
the second is maintenance of the free transit status of
straits traditionally used for international navigation.
The Soviet Union, according to a presentation made at
the Seventh American-Soviet Conference on Asia held in
Tahoe, California in May 1986, stated that Southeast Asia is
an extremely important area and that the USSR intends to
actively develop its trade and economic relations. More
importantly, the Soviets are "interested in ensuring the
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safety of the international trade sea routes passing through
Southeast Asia." [Chufrin, 1986, p. 10] The Collective
Asian Security System that the Soviets proposed has not been
a success, largely because the littoral nations are aware of
the Soviet support for the Vietnamese and the Vietnamese
occupation of Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the Soviets intend
to improve their relative standing in Southeast Asia.
Gorbachev has made this a priority. [Nations, 14 August
1986, p. 30]
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IV. FORCE COMPOSITIONS AND CAPABILITIES
The first part of Tables 1, 2 and 3, for each country,
shows the force composition in 1971. [Sellers, 1971] The
second part shows the force composition in 1976. [Sellers,
1976] The third part shows the Battle Orders as of 1985.
[Copley, 1986] Each table is preceded by comments relevant
to the hypothesis.
A. INDONESIA
According to Jones and Hildreth [Jones, 1984, p. 27],
Indonesia's defense policy is intended to deter invasion and
smother insurrections with a mobile army, a strong navy and
a strong air force. Its current order of battle supports
that argument, especially if one notes the long term
development of the military. In 1966, most of the
Indonesian inventory was Soviet-supplied, but after the
change in governments, the sources of military equipment
were diversified. The Navy especially benefited from this
policy. Between 1970 and 1976, there was little change in
the complexion of the fleet. For the next four years, the
change was gradual, but important. In 1980, a twenty-year
plan was launched to change the character of the Navy.
Frigates, submarines and fast attack craft have been added
to the inventory. The Navy is purposefully developing the
capability to do more than coastal defense. The
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acquisitions are offensive. According to Jane's , all major
surface ships are being fitted with missiles [Moore, 1986,
p. 252]. The two mine warfare vessels will broaden the
fleet's capabilities as well since they are capable of
laying mines as well as hunting and sweeping.
Currently operational are frigates built by the US, the
USSR, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, and the UK. The CODOG-
powered frigate from Yugoslavia is equipped with SSMs, guns,
and a helicopter pad, and is used for training. The second
one should be on line soon. The three Tribal class frigates
from Great Britain have WASP helicopters. [Moore, 1985, p.
38]
The Indonesians added submarines in 1977 and currently
have two Type 2 09 class, with another two on order. Their
third submarine is an old Soviet Whiskey class which is
probably not seaworthy. According to Jane '
s
, the planned
strength is six. [Moore, 1985, p. 39]
Their other vessels come from a variety of sources.
Some are old, but will be maintained until no longer practi-
cal. The emphasis on coastal defense is evident because
patrol craft are a high priority. The four SSM-armed 290-
Ton fast attack craft are from South Korea. The two gun-
armed 396-Ton fast attack craft are from South Korea. The
two gun-armed 396-Ton fast attack craft are from West
Germany, with an option to build six more in Surabaya. The
two Tripartite-class minesweepers indicate that the Navy is
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aware of the danger from mines. [Moore, 1985, p. 39] There
are plans to build four coastal minesweepers. [Moore, 1985-
86, p. 160]
Of interest is the significant arms industry being
developed within the country. Indonesia has developed or
will shortly have the capability to manufacture (either
alone or in coproduction) the following: CASA C-212
Aviocars, CN-235 (twin-turboprop transport) , BO-105 helicop-
ters, SA-330 Pumas, AS-232 Super Puma, Bell 412, Pazmany PL-
2 (light two-seater) , Kawasaki BK-117 helicopter, rockets,
torpedoes, missiles, small arms (many types) , and patrol
boats. Additionally, a major agreement between the Dutch
and the Indonesians established a maintenance center for the
repair and upkeep of naval vessels. [International Defense
Intermetrics]
The current shopping list includes advanced fighter air-
craft, light tanks, an extensive command and control system,
submarines and additional ships. [DMS, Indonesia
. 1985] In
August 1986, Indonesia agreed to purchase twelve F-16s for
delivery in 1988. Nusantara Aircraft Industry, the
country's aircraft manufacturing company, will produce the
basic airframe, the engine and some of the avionics, under a
General Dynamics offset deal. General Murdani favored the
F-16, partly because it makes possible a joint maintenance
program with Thailand and Singapore, who have agreed to pur-
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Source: [Sellers, 1971, pp. 114-115]
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
(b) Order of Battle, 1976
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Source: [Sellers, 1977, p. 100]
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
(c) Order of Battle, 1985
Naval Battle Order
Manpower 42,500 (includes 12,000 Marine
Corps and 1,000 Naval Air Arm)
Principal Equipment Fleet
Frigates
4 ex-US Claude Jones-class




1 Hejar Dewartaru-class training
frigate
Submarines
2 West German Type 2 09





PSK Mk.5-class with Exocet
ex-Australian Attack-class
ex-Soviet Kronstadt-class




4 ex-Soviet T-43-class ocean
minesweepers
Amphibious Vessels




Miscellaneous Vessels : Survey ships
(4) , auxiliaries and repair ships
(3) , replenishment oilers (3) , tugs
(5) , sail training ship (1)
,











Source: [Copley, 1986, p. 335]
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B. MALAYSIA
At independence, Malaysia's military utilized British
arms, French helicopters, and Canadian transports. The
force level was small, but rapidly increased to counter the
Indonesian and internal threats. There was no pressure to
acquire large weapons systems immediately because the
Commonwealth forces provided additional security.
Malaysia wished to acquire fighter aircraft and
attempted to deal with the British and the French for their
proposed purchases. The US pressured both the UK and France
not to make the sale because of the Philippine/Sabah issue.
This caused Malaysia to diversify its sources for military
equipment and resent superpower interference. In 19 69,
Malaysia accepted ten obsolescent Sabres from Australia on
the condition that Australia station two squadrons of Mirage
Ills at Butterworth. (Australia recently announced that it
will withdraw its fighters.) Finally, in 1972, the US
authorized the sale of F5E Tiger lis and Sidewinders and in
1974, five C-130S.
Malaysia has recently taken delivery on forty refurbish-
ed A-4s. Singapore did the electronic rework after the US
refused. The Malaysian Air Defense Ground Environment
(MADGE) system, built by Hughes, is now operational and can
integrate a 3-D long-range radar with advanced data
processing and new communications system. Its range covers
all Malaysian air space of concern.
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since 1962, France has been the primary supplier of
helicopters. The UK is still a major supplier, but signifi-
cant purchases have also been made from Belgium, FRG, Italy,
Indonesia, Sweden and Switzerland. Negotiations are contin-
uing with the USSR for the purchase of Mi26 military
transport helicopters. The ideal is unlikely because of the
maintenance arrangements the Soviets are proposing.
["Uplifting Thoughts," PEER, 18 September 1986, p. 13] The
new fleet air arm will support the frigates that have
aviation capability. [Moore, 1985, p. 36]
The Navy has grown from 1000 to 9000 men in just 14
years, with a projection for 15,000. A new naval base,
Lumut, has been completed on the Strait of Malacca. Four
missile craft (265 Ton) were built in France during the
1970s and four more were built in Sweden at the end of that
decade. The French craft have two Exocet SSMs and the
Swedish four. The three logistic support ships are,
according to Jane'
s
"a sensible investment for navies in
Southeast Asia increasing the flexibility of smaller vessels
in an area notable for long passage distances." [Moore,
1986, p. 140] Ten fast attack craft with Exocet capability
are on order. A total of eight MCM ships are planned.
Those in service carry two 40mm guns instead of the usual
single 20mm gun. Two 1800-Ton support ships were commis-
sioned in 1984 for training and light craft support duties.
[Moore, 1985, p. 36] South Korea built a small underway
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replenishment tanker while two tank landing ships were
ordered from South Korea and will replace two World War II
ships. Another frigate is currently on order, as are
several other craft. [DMS, Malaysia
. 1985]
Military personnel are studying AEW, EW, ASW, and
submarine warfare with various navies. Discussions about
medium range diesel-electric submarines are being held, and
the Malaysian Navy is prepared to look beyond basic coastal
defense. [Moore, 1985, p. 36]
C. SINGAPORE
Singapore's military build-up has been the most
dramatic. In 19 66, they had no navy. Two years later, the
navy had 50 personnel and one craft. By 1971, the armed
forces totalled 14,800, of which the Navy had 500. By 1977,
the Navy had 1000 men, and added patrol boats and landing
craft. In 1985, the Navy counted 4700 regulars and had
vessels capable of interdiction as well as local defense.
The naval expansion was part of its "'poisoned shrimp'
strategy . . . [which] promises to inflict serious damage
through forceful retaliation on any small or middle-sized
power that might attempt to overcome Singapore." [Wu, 1972,
p. 14]
Singapore is focusing on air defense and has improved
its capability by adding British Rapier SAM launchers and
Hawk missiles. More significantly, acquiring four Grumman



























Source: [Sellers, 1971, p. 158]







1 ASW frigate with Seacat missiles
6 coastal minesweepers
24 patrol craft










Source: [Sellers, 1977, p. 140]
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)








1 Yarrow type (with Seacat)
1 UK type 41/61
Light Forces
4 Perdana class FAC (with Exocet
SSM)
4 Hadalan M FAC (with Exocet SSM)
9 Brooke Marine 29-meter patrol
boats (under construction)
22 large patrol craft
6 Jerong FAC
Mine Warfare Forces
2 ex-British Ton class coastal
minesweepers





1 diving tender; 18 police launches
(PX class) ; 6 launches (improved PX
class) of which 4 operated by
police; 6 patrol craft; 1 ex-British
Ton class survey vessel.
Naval Aviation
3 C-130H-MPS used for Maritime
patrol
**
Also 2 type FS 150D (with Exocet) with 2 more planned











Source: [Copley, 1986, pp. 464-465]
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dramatic increase in air defense -capabilities. Singapore
can monitor with ease all Straits traffic at the southern
choke point. The Air Force plans to modernize its forces
with the purchase of the F-16, but there is still ag roup
which favors the F/A-18 because it has a greater combat
radius, faster acceleration and more advance avionics. The
avionics include an onboard computer system which can be
operated with the E2C Hawkeye.
Singapore has developed a very large defense industry,
mostly producing sophisticated items with relatively low
prices. Only its shipbuilding industry is currently in a
slump. Singapore Aircraft Industries is doing particularly
well, especially in refurbishing A-4 Skyhawks.
D. VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS IN REGION
Table 4 illustrates the following points:
- Indonesia has the highest military expenditures, but
Singapore and Malaysia spend a higher percentage of
their GNP
- Indonesia has the lowest GNP per capita
- Indonesia has been the major importer
- Singapore spends about one-fifth of its government
budget on its armed forces
- Singapore has been a consistent arms exporter, but the
amount is insignificant compared to total exports
- If additional information is needed, the SIPRI yearbook
details precisely what equipment has been brought from
whom in specific years.
Figures are from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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TABLE 3




2 seaward defense boats
6 patrol boats
Source: [Sellers, 1971, p. 212]




1,000 men (Reserves of 500)
Vessels
2 seaward defense boats
9 patrol boats (Gabriel SSM)
1 landing ship
4 landing craft
3 miscellaneous small craft
Source: Sellers, 1977, p. 187]







6 Vosper Thornycroft 3 3.5 meter
design; 3 each Type A and B fast
attach craft
12 Swift-class coastal patrol craft
6 Lurssen designed TNC-45 class
some with Gabriel missile




6 ex-US LST type
2 ex-Australian RPL type
4 Ayer Chawan-class RPLs
Minewarfare
2 ex-US Redwing class coastal
minesweepers
Training Ships
1 Ford class large patrol craft
1 250 ton ex-patrol craft
NB
The Marine Police also operate a
number of vessels including 4
Vosper Thornycroft PX-class, 20
Vosper (Private) PC-32 class, and
19 new construction (PX) patrol
craft.
NB
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The armed forces of the littoral states have changed
significantly over the years. The most recent orders-of-
battle reflect the determination of the governments to
defend their regional autonomy. The naval forces of all
three are adequate to protect the fisheries and control
smuggling. While their navies are not on a par with a major
power, general naval capability is not required for passage
denial. The sea-based missile is a great equalizer in the
narrow channel of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
[Leifer, 1978, pp. 153-154]
In 1984, the Indonesian defense policy was designed
essentially to deter invasion. Under the current five year
plan, the focus is on improving military capability and the
indigenous arms industries. In just fifteen years,
Indonesia has developed the capability to monitor and stop
maritime movement through the Straits. On the other hand,
the world economic slump has had a negative impact on the
Indonesian economy and future force upgrades will probably
be delayed.
Indonesia intends to use the Lurssen patrol craft for
both attack and defense. The boats are capable of interdic-
tion and carry Exocet and torpedoes. The Navy also uses
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ASROC and Styx XX-N-2 missiles. The latter remain from the
Soviets and their condition is not known, although they are
believed unusable. The United Kingdom has agreed to sell
more Rapier (SAM) missiles and to transfer the technology to
permit manufacture of the system [ADJ, 1 April 1986].
Another British company has agreed to coproduce an early
warning radar [IDR, 1 September 1986].
According to Jane's Defense Weekly . Indonesia has shown
a strong interest in anti-submarine warfare [1 February
1986]. They also are improving their own submarine capa-
bility. Recently, there were reports that Indonesia might
build ten more Type 209 submarines in Indonesia [PDR, 1
October 1986]
.
Malaysia initiated its 4th National Plan in 1981
intending to spend $4.6 billion modernizing the armed forces
over a five year period. Plans included the construction of
two new air bases in North Malaysia, a new naval base on the
Straits, infantry camps, training bases, and A-4 acquisi-
tions. The recession caused the postponement of much of the
modernization, but the A-4s are in the inventory. The Naval
Base at Lumut has also been completed.
The Royal Malasian Navy is looking outward. The
declaration of the two-hundred mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) in 1980 created a new focus for the Navy. The Navy
could not protect the 160,000 square miles that Malaysia
claimed. Consequently, to become an instrument of policy.
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it had to upgrade its equipment. The near term objective is
to control the EEZ, and force procurement to reflect that
need.
To that end, the Lerici class minehunters joined the
fleet on 26 March 1986, representing a definite upgrade in
minewarfare capability. Although there are no definite
funds allocated, The Netherlands, France, Great Britain and
West Germany have offered to sell submarines to Malaysia.
According to the Deputy Minister of Defense, Abang Abu Baker
Mustafa, Malaysia will acquire its first submarine by 1990
or 1995. [JDW, 26 April 1986].
The RMAF is taking over air defense responsibilities as
the Australians withdraw, and is considering what other air-
craft are needed. The Australians, under license to
McDonnell Douglas, are promoting the TF/A-18. [JDW, 1
February 1986] However, according to DFW [23 February 1986]
it is not likely that funding will be available to replace
the F-5 for several years. There is a requirement to
upgrade the Counterinsurgency (COINS) forces with 4 new
helicopters. If they can not buy what they need from the
West, they will negotiate with Moscow for the Mi26. Western
helicopter manufacturers considered for meeting the RMN's
needs were Aerospatiale, Sikorsky, and Westland. The
Westland Wasps phased out by the British Navy will be used.
[ASJ, 1 August 1986]
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Even though Malaysia supposedly deviated from the
regional policy of buying like aircraft when they purchased
the A-4, Singapore and Indonesia's "condemnation" of the
purchase was rather mild and Singapore geared up very
quickly for A-4 refurbishment and upgrading. The A-4s, in
conjunction with the F-16s, provide a balanced air picture.
Malaysia could afford more A-4s than F-16s, and there is an
advantage to having greater numbers of aircraft if one
considers the short expected life of a combat aircraft.
Singapore's defense posture is definitely pro-Western.
The island nation is vulnerable to conquest because of its
geography. The armed forces are keyed to coastal defense,
but have the capability to anticipate attack over the
horizon and put up an initial defense. The forces are
geared to protecting Singapore's economic interests, which
includes free access to its ports. The Lourssen fast attack
craft are equipped with SSMs and could be used against ships
unwelcome in Singapore's waters.
The Air Force is a critical factor in any scenario
involving the Straits. The Hawkeye increases Singapore's
warning time and the information could be shared with the
other littorals. To deter the surface threat, Singapore
will be mounting the Harpoon anti-ship missile on its A-4s
[JDW, 26 July 1986]. The contract to purchase the F-16 has
been the subject of many rumors. The most recent was in
Jane's Defense Weekly [18 November 1986] which implied that
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the contract still might be cancelled. Australia would
prefer that Singapore purchase the TF/A-18 for the same
reasons it is encouraging Malaysia to purchase the aircraft.
Singapore will be improving its surface capability, too.
The Navy is considering what type weapon system to arm the
six Lurssen corvettes on order. A French company is
promoting the low-altitude ground-to-air weapon system that
it manufactures. [IDR, 1 September 1986] Additionally,
Singapore just purchased 76/62 OTO Super Rapid naval guns
which are a multi-purpose anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-
missile system [JDW, 21 June 1986]
.
The Malaysian Hughes system and the Singaporean AWACS
completely cover the Straits airspace. Combined with the
air defense system all three are developing, any hostile
force could reasonably expect to be opposed.
While the area is not pro-Soviet (in fact, relations
with the Soviets have been strained) [IDI, p. 9], the area
can not be considered pro-US in time of conflict. Indonesia
is heavily committed to remaining non-aligned, and Malaysia
and Singapore are not likely to shift out of their regional
agreements. All three countries are aware of the increased
Soviet naval activity in the area. Soviet ships routinely
use Cam Rahn Bay, and Soviet submarines are sailing in
Southeast Asian waters. Indonesia has been forced to step
up its ASW program. [IDI, p. 3]
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Even though Malaysia delayed the' building of its new air
bases, one could reasonably expect that they would have
access, if not control, of the Butterworth facility during a
conflict. Indonesia and Singapore have basing available to
ensure air coverage of the southeastern end of the Straits.
The new naval base, Lumut, on the northern side of the
Straits, fills the final gap for sea control at the western
end of the Straits, considering Indonesia's Belawan base.
Singapore can control its choke point and is upgrading its
mine warfare capability. Indonesia has sufficient naval
bases at the Pacific access to cause losses to any hostile
forces. Together, the three littoral states are a formida-
ble opponent.
B. UNITED STATES
The United States' strategic interest in Southeast Asian
waters centers on freedom of the seas and the maintenance of
open sealanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The US
national interest is best served by unrestricted seas that
promote free trade and improve the US strategic posture.
[Simon, 1982, p. 136]
The ability to freely transit the straits in the region
improves the efficiency of the Seventh Fleet. The closure
of straits, particularly of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, adds time to the transit between the oceans, and
could be a critical factor in a situation that required
moving the fleet quickly from one ocean to the other.
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[Alagappa, 1986, p. 11] The littoral states have not
restricted passage of US military ships in the past, and
have been quite tolerant of task forces moving through the
Straits. Planners, however, should not assume that US
forces will be able to use the straits or that others will
be denied their use.
The US is committed to sea lanes in Southeast Asia
remaining open for maritime traffic, especially for its East
Asian allies whose economies are dependent on petroleum
products. Japan, alone, receives 80% of its oil imports
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. [Rusi and
Brassey's, 1986, p. 284]
UNCLOS III, according to Ken Booth, will affect future
naval strategy, but not the exercise of naval power,
although it might cause it to veer marginally [Booth, 1985,
p. 7], Since the US did not ratify the Convention itself,
but acknowledges much of it, the definition of what is
international is controversial. For example, air traffic
between US bases in the Philippines and Diego Garcia must
fly over Malaysian or Indonesian territory. The littorals
can serve as a barrier. UNCLOS III defined the air space
over an international strait as international airspace, but
Malaysia and Indonesia do not acknowledge the Straits to be
international waters.
The US posture is beneficial when the littorals allow
the US access to airfields and bases. Currently Singapore
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allows P-3CS to operate out of its -air bases and US ships to
dock. The US would benefit also if the littorals could
defend their own region against the Soviets. That would be
one less area for the Seventh Fleet to protect during a
conflict.
A US presence in the area is advantageous for the
littorals. Only the US can counter the Soviet presence and
possible threats from other Asian navies. The PRC is
building its navy for power projection. Vietnam claims
islands that are also claimed by the littorals. India is
expanding its naval facilities on the Andamans and has
already deployed into the area.
Sealane security is best viewed from the perspective of
regional security. ASEAN is one of the US ' s largest trading
partners, even ahead of Europe. The littorals, as part of
ASEAN, have encouraged a US military presence in the region
based on a shared perception of the threat and on mutual
interests. The US balances the Soviet presence. [Alagappa,
1986, p. 1] The US supports the littoral states in their
call to have Vietnamese forces withdrawn from Cambodia.
[Zagoria, 1986, p. 8] The US recognizes that the "American
national interest lies in furthering the harmony and
development of the Pacific-Asian region." [Scalapino, 1986,
p. 19]
The US military presence in this region is mostly
maritime. The combined exercises initiated at the start of
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the Reagan administration emphasized naval amphibious and
air exercises, command, control and communications and
logistics. Malaysia engages in regular exercises with the
US fleet. [Alagappa, 1986, p. 7]
The US interests in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
were well summarized by Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman,
who said.
It has always been the Navy's mission to defend our
freedom of navigation, to hold open our vital sea lanes
and to maintain our transit rights through the ocean's
straits and narrows. [Moore, 1982, p. 121]
C. USSR
The USSR has been interested in the Southeast Asian
waterways and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore much
longer than the US. The Soviets supported the Communist
Party in Indonesia not too long after their own revolution.
They have actively courted the littoral states since the
1960s. They had some success in Indonesia, which accepted
military aid, but that success was short lived. The change
in leadership in 1966 ended their public role in any of the
littoral nations for several years.
The Soviets have made new commitments to reverse the
quarter-century decline of their influence in the region
[Nations, 14 August 1986]. According to Donald Zagoria,
their interest in the region is based on a desire to limit
the PRC's influence, to weaken US power, to prevent ASEAN
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from becoming pro-West, and to shift the power balance to
favor the USSR. [Zagoria, 1982, p. 154]
The Soviet Union considers itself a Pacific power and
"therefore has full right to protect its national interests
in the Pacific basin, including the security of the Soviet
Far East and freedom of navigation in international water."
[Chufrin, 1986, p. 13] Accordingly, the Soviet Pacific
Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet fleets [ Soviet
Military Power , 1986, pp. 8-9] Moscow considers Singapore
an important regional factor, since the early 1970s.
Singapore controls access to the choke point between the
Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Soviet naval forces in the
Indian Ocean are drawn from the Pacific fleet. Consequent-
ly, once the Soviets became a naval power they were
interested in ensuring free passage through the Straits
[Weu, 1972, p. 24].
According to Dr. Frank Cibulka, the Malaysian Minister
of Justice reported that Soviet submarines have been sighted
passing through the Straits and have been detected in the
South China Sea off the coast of peninsular Malaysia, and in
the waters off Sabah. That is undoubtedly part of the
continued Soviet effort to prevent the United States from
establishing a monopoly in the region. Soviet policy:
stresses the strategic unity of both the Northeast and
Southeast Asian regions. . . . Freedom of strategic
access through Southeast Asia . . . has become a salient
Soviet interest and one that will assume greater signifi-
cance as the Soviet Union expands its carrier-based fleet
in the 1990s. [Buszynsi, 1986, p. 596]
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The littorals are embarrassed -by Soviet overtures, but
do not feel that the Soviets are really a threat to them.
The problem is between the superpowers, and they expect to
be bystanders. Alagappa states that "it is believed [by
the littorals] that the Soviets have neither the capability
nor the interest to threaten the security of the Asean
states." [Alagappa, 1986, p. 18] The Soviet image did not
benefit from the military assistance they supplied
Indonesia. They were considered a threat only when they
supported the Vietnamese. With the image and track record,
it is difficult for the Soviets to attain the lasting
regional influence they want. Still, the Chinese are
considered a bigger threat by Malaysia and Indonesia.
D. OTHER FACTORS
1. Mining of the Straits
The Straits are easily mined. Malaysian coastal
waters are sandy-bottomed and have an average depth of less
than fifty meters. The Royal Malaysian Navy realizes the
potential for minewarfare in the Straits and has acquired
four Lerici class MCM ships. Singapore does not have that
capability, but the waters around Singapore are no less
mineable. Singapore needs new minehunters. [Moore, 1985,
pp. 37-38] Areas with sandy bottoms and strong currents are
perfect for mines. The sand shifts and covers the mines
until they are not visible on sonar, but does nothing to
lessen the deadliness of the mines. Nonetheless, "the well
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trained crew of a single ship can. -clear a channel quicker
than a whole squadron sweeping," according to Jane '
s
.
[Moore, 1983, p. 101] Malaysia is developing that
capability.
There are several scenarios in which the Straits
might be mined. One would be for the littorals to do it
themselves, to prevent anyone from using the channel freely.
In that case, the Straits would be effectively closed. The
littorals have developed enough naval power to prevent the
Straits from being forced without conquering the littorals
themselves. The littorals have anti-ship missiles mounted
on aircraft and on ships. Additionally, shore gunners would
be able to foil units attempting to clear narrow parts of
channels.
Another scenario would be for an outside power to
mine the Straits to keep others from using the Straits. In
that case, the Malaysians might be able to clear the Straits
until the next time the outside power laid more mines. A
variation would be for one navy to make the transit and then
block the Straits so that anyone else coming through would
be slowed down.
A more realistic scenario would be where one of the
superpowers attempted to prevent another from using the
Straits in time to arrive on station in the Indian Ocean
littoral during a crisis, as in the Indo-Pakistani war. In
that particular case, a short delay in arriving should make
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the difference between being able to bring a show of power
to bear on a third party or not.
2 . Policy Changes by Littoral Nations
The security interests of the littoral nations are
linked to the domestic and the international environments
[Alagappa, 1986, p. 16]. Domestic factors include ethnic
problems, religious issues, the economy and the political
situation. The international factors are based on threat
perception. Malaysia and Indonesia perceive the threat
coming from the PRC. Singapore perceives the Soviets and
the Vietnamese as the primary threat. [Alagappa, 1986, p.
17] Indonesia and Malaysia are aware of the growing Soviet
power in the region, but do not believe that the Soviets
would threaten their security, although they do believe it
is necessary for the US to maintain a strategic balance in
the region.
If the littorals had to pick a side in a conflict,
whether an actual war or a crisis, they would probably favor
the US, if only for economic reasons and the domestic anti-
communist sentiment [Alagappa, 1986, p. 19]. What could
cause a change in that position might be a strong appeal
from the non-aligned countries to remain uninvolved in a
crisis. Indonesia is still acknowledged a leader in the
Non-aligned movement, and would be more likely swayed by
such arguments in a situation that did not affect Indonesian
security. it is unlikely, though, even in that situation
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that Indonesia would actually attempt to block the Straits,
although it might deny passage through Indonesia waters. In
the near term, the policies of the littorals are not likely
to change.
3 . Miscellaneous
The threat to the littoral states is more apt to be
internal unrest than overt hostilities with another country.
Singapore is least likely to be affected by internal unrest,
but there is a slight chance that the economic situation
could create problems for the government. The government
may change its character if Prime Minister Lee steps down.
The low birth rate among ethnic Chinese is more of a concern
to the government than any actual ethnic problem.
That is not the case in Malaysia, where there is
tension between Malays and Chinese. As the economy has
slowed, and the practice of favoring Malays become
entrenched, young Chinese question policies that prevent
them from finding jobs and advancing. The Islamic revival,
too, leads to favoritism for the Moslems. That creates
contention in both Malaysia and Indonesia.
Of the three littorals, Indonesia is still dealing
with insurgents. Malaysia has quelled its communist rebel-
lion, but exercises caution when dealing with the Chinese
community, since most of the rebels were ethnic Chinese.
The fear of a fifth column still exists. Indonesia is
probably the most likely to have internal problems because
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the factors previously noted, combined with the style of
government, are not conducive to a stable environment.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In 1978, Buzan observed that the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore were unlikely to become serious objects of
conflict, except in a general war. The cost for the
littorals of closing the Straits would greatly outweigh the
benefits of doing so. [Buzan, 1978, p. 46] That situation
has not changed. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are
not important enough to warrant consideration if the
littorals decided to refuse access during hostilities in the
region. While US strategists should consider them when
planning a military campaign, they are not worth the effort
to guarantee their availability in a crisis situation.
The contingency plan for regional hostilities might
assume that the Straits were open, but the primary plan
should not. In either situation, the US should be prepared
to prevent others from using the Straits. If the littorals
will not or cannot do so, then the US should be prepared to
mine them. Mining would not guarantee that a persistent
enemy could not use the Straits, but it would raise the
price for doing so. The countermine capability of the
littorals is based on the current and proposed Order of
Battle, so the mining would have to be repeated regularly.
Aircraft coming in to lay mines would have to avoid the air
defense network.
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Attempting to use the Straits without cooperation from
the littorals would be an exercise in futility. The capa-
bilities developed since 1976 are more than adequate to stop
ships from passing through the Straits. Even where the
naval response is slow, there are enough places where the
channel is narrow enough for shore guns to do damage.
The above has assumed regional hostility, but the US is
more likely to be involved in a situation where it is neces-
sary to move military units through the Straits to stage a
presence in a conflict on the Indian Ocean littoral. The US
would want reasonable assurance that none of the littoral
states would use their forces, in particular the missile-
armed fast attack craft, to impede transit. [Moore, 1986,
p. 141] Additionally, the US would be in a better strategic
position if the littorals would hinder Soviet passage. The
Straits of Malacca and Singapore are elements in any
military situation because they decrease the response time
of a fleet moving from one ocean to another.
Aside from the military value of the Straits as a choke
point, the region is important legally. The US must not
deviate from its position that the Straits are subject to
international navigation and that US passage is not to be
hindered. Politically, the region is important because the
littorals are relatively stable and are not likely to switch
to communism. Their styles of government are not modeled
after the US, but they are relatively stable, especially
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compared to other Third World states'. The economic value of
the littoral nations has placed them, as part of ASEAN, as
one of the US ' s major trade partners.
Other straits in the region have definite strategic
value. Submarines can be deployed in their deeper waters
undetected and improve the strategic value of the nuclear
triad. Here again, the US must stand firm on its right to
transit international waters without interference and use
channels customarily open for international navigation.
The littoral nations have the capability to control the
initiative in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The
current US policies in the region have not guaranteed the
littorals' position during a conflict, but it appears that
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